Culp Construction Company and Federal Insurance Company v. Buildmart Mall, a Utah limited partnership, et al. : Reply Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Culp Construction Company and Federal
Insurance Company v. Buildmart Mall, a Utah
limited partnership, et al. : Reply Brief of
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Robert S. Howell; Tibbals, Howell, Moxley & Wilkins; Mark T. Davenport, Doug K.
Butler; Figari & Davenport; attorneys for respondent Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation.
John P. Ashton, Brian S. King; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; John A. Kincaid, John R. O\'keefe;
Kincaid & McGrath; attorneys for appellant, First Federal of Pittsburgh, Formerly First Federal
Savings & Loan Association, Successor by Merger to Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








JfOSif IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 880388 
REPLY BRIEF 




Appeal from a Final Order 
of the Third District 
Court For Salt Lake 
County, Utah 




John P. Ashton (0134) 
Brian S. King (4610) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
John A. Kincaid, Jr. (28799) 
John R. O'Keefe, Jr. (36633) 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
Two Gateway Center, 19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
Telephone: (412) 281-212 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT FIRST 
FEDERAL OF PITTSBURGH, 
FORMERLY FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
6 LOAN ASSOCIATION, SUCCESSOR 
BY MERGER TO TOWER FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (2478) 
Robert S. Howell (1559) 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Two Fifty Seven Towers, #850 
257 East 200 South-2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
Mark T. Davenport 
Doug K. Butler 
FIGARI & DAVENPORT 
4800 NCNB Plaza 
901 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Telephone: (214) 939-2000 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION 
FILED 
AUG 2 51989 
Clerk, Suprerip 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 880388 
REPLY BRIEF 




Appeal from a Final Order 
of the Third District 
Court For Salt Lake 
County, Utah 




John P. Ashton (0134) 
Brian S. King (4610) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
17 5 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
John A. Kincaid, Jr. (28799) 
John R. O'Keefe, Jr. (36633) 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
Two Gateway Center, 19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
Telephone: (412) 281-212 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT FIRST 
FEDERAL OF PITTSBURGH, 
FORMERLY FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, SUCCESSOR 
BY MERGER TO TOWER FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (2478) 
Robert S. Howell (1559) 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Two Fifty Seven Towers, #850 
257 East 200 South-2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
Mark T. Davenport 
Doug K. Butler 
FIGARI & DAVENPORT 
4800 NCNB Plaza 
901 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Telephone: (214) 939-2000 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION 
•>T OF PARTIES 
: LO Lawye 
Title Insurance Corporation to have been in.v^vu V^i the above-
captioned matter: 
1. -U1IDMART YAT . r . ^  ed p.i; tnership ; 
2. I' MAI.J. . -ft c-ieiiera] Partner f Buildmart Mall; ; 
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4. ^HIRL WRIGK, , 
5. GLORIA S. WRIGHT; 
6. S.B.K. PARTNERSHIP; 
7. FOOTHILL THRIFT; 
8. FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A.; 
9. HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.; 
10. NOISE CONTROL, INC.; 
11. JERRY MELLEN; 
12. COMPLEX FABRICATIONS, INC.; 
13. RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 
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Although the above-mentioned parties were involved in 
the Lower Court litigation, and some were involved in three 
separate appeals before this Court (other than the instant appeal 
and cross-appeal), all of those appeals have since been 
dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. The following are 
the only parties to the instant appeal and cross-appeal: Tower 
Federal Savings and Loan Association (now known as First Federal 
of Pittsburgh) and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 5, 1988, Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association ("Tower") hand-delivered its Notice of Appeal from 
the Lower Court's September 6, 1988 final Order to the office of 
the local counsel of Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation 
("Lawyers Title") at or about 5:00 p.m. Affidavit of Jeffrey R. 
Oritt at %2. 
2. On or about October 16, 1988, Lawyers Title's 
counsel contacted the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office to 
determine the date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal, in 
order to determine the last date on which Lawyers Title could 
timely file its Notice of Cross-Appeal. Affidavit of Jeffrey R, 
Oritt at %3. 
3. The Utah Supreme Court deputy clerk told Lawyers 
Title's counsel that the date of filing of Tower's Notice of 
Appeal was October 6, 1988. Pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, Lawyers Title had until 5:00 p.m. 
October 20, 1988 to file its Notice of Cross-Appeal. Affidavit 
of Jeffrey R. Oritt at f4. 
4. On October 20, 1988, Lawyers Title timely filed 
its Notice of Cross-Appeal. R. 9570-9572; Affidavit of Jeffrey 
R, Oritt at f5. 
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5. Subsequent to receiving Tower's Brief in 
Opposition to Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal, Lawyers Title's local 
counsel contacted the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office and spoke 
with deputy clerk Sue Richards, who told him that the date of 
filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal was October 6, 1988. Lawyers 
Title's local counsel then contacted the Third District Court 
Clerk, who told counsel that the date of filing of Tower's Notice 
of Appeal was October 5, 1988. Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Oritt at 
16. 
6. Lawyers Title's counsel again called Sue Richards. 
At his request she reviewed her file and spoke with the Third 
District Court Clerk's Office. She had received Tower's Notice 
of Appeal in or about mid-October 1988, and could not make out 
the Third District Court Clerk's date-stamp. She called the 
District Court Clerk, who told her that the date-stamp said 
October 6, 1988. Ms. Richards then entered that date in the 
Supreme Court file as the date upon which Tower's Notice of 
Appeal was filed. The first time Ms. Richards became aware of 
the difference in the dates being used by the respective clerks' 
offices was when she was so informed by Mr. Oritt on August 15, 
1989. Affidavit of Sue Richards at 1112-5. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lawyers Title timely filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
Upon receiving Towels Notice of Appeal and determining from his 
client that they wished to take a Cross-Appeal from the Lower 
Court's final Order, Lawyers Title's local counsel contacted the 
Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office to determine the date of filing 
of Tower's Notice of Appeal. The Utah Supreme Court Clerk's 
Office always has the same Notice of Appeal filing date in their 
Court file as the Lower Court Clerk's Office in their Court 
files, because the Lower Court sends copies of the filed Notice 
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Accordingly, the dates 
provided by the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office can be relied 
upon by attorneys seeking information. 
In the instant case, however, the date on the copy of 
Tower's Notice of Appeal was illegible. A deputy clerk in the 
Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office contacted the Third District 
Court Clerk to determine the correct date. The Third District 
Court Clerk's Office told the deputy clerk that the date was 
October 6, 1988. She entered that date in the Supreme Court 
file, and it remained as the date of record until August 15, 
1989. Apparently, some time after mid-October, 1988, but before 
August 15, 1989, the Third District Court Clerk's Office changed 
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their Court file to reflect that Tower filed its Notice of Appeal 
on October 5, not October 6. Lawyers Title reasonably relied 
upon the October 6 date of filing it received from the Utah 
Supreme Court Clerk's Office. Any resulting untimeliness of 
filing is due to miscommunications between the Third District 
Court Clerk's Office and the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office, 
not any negligence or error on the part of Lawyers Title. 
Even if this Court determines that Lawyers Title 
technically filed an untimely Notice of Cross-Appeal, the 
circumstances surrounding that filing constitute ''excusable 
neglect" such that this Court can extend the time for the filing 
of Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal by one day, in order to 
make that filing timely. Moreover, Rule 2 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court does not prohibit the Court from suspending 
the requirements of Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, this 
Court should extend by one day the fourteen-day period during 
which to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal in order to allow the 
filing of Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal and hear Lawyers 
Title's Cross-Appeal. 
Tower is not entitled to any damages under Rule 33(a) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Tower's claim that they 
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are entitled to such damages is based solely upon their claim 
that Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal is untimely. Based 
upon the argument set forth above, Tower's claim lacks merit, and 
therefore Tower is not entitled to any Rule 33(a) damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Lawyers Title Timely Filed Its Notice of Cross-Appeal 
A. Introduction 
At this late date in the briefing of this appeal, Tower 
is trying to persuade the Court that the filing of Lawyers 
Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal was untimely, and therefore should 
be dismissed. However, the undisputed facts, as supported by 
Affidavits from a deputy clerk in the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's 
Office and Lawyers Title's local counsel, reflect that Lawyers 
Title acted prudently in determining the last date on which it 
could file its Notice of Cross-Appeal, and filed its Notice 
accordingly. Any appearance of untimeliness is due to 
miscommunications between the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office 
and the Third District Court Clerk's Office, not Lawyers Title. 
Even if counsel for Lawyers Title had contacted the Third 
District Court Clerk's Office it is reasonable to assume that the 
District Court Clerk would have supplied to him the same 
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information regarding the filing date of Tower's Notice of Appeal 
as was given to the Supreme Court Clerk. 
B. Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal Was Timely Piled 
Based Upon The Records In the Utah Supreme Court 
Clerk's Office 
As can be seen from the Affidavits of Sue Richards and 
Jeffrey R. Oritt, attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum "A" 
and "B", respectively, Lawyers Title's local counsel received 
Tower's Notice of Appeal at or about the close of business on 
October 5, 1988. Counsel subsequently contacted Lawyers Title to 
obtain final approval to cross-appeal the issue of attorney's 
fees. As the fourteen-day period in which Lawyers Title had to 
decide to appeal was drawing to a close, Lawyers Title's counsel 
contacted the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office in order to 
determine the exact date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal. 
He was told the date of filing was October 6, 1988. Based upon 
Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, counsel 
determined that the last day on which Lawyers Title could file 
its Notice of Cross-Appeal was October 20, 1988. Lawyers Title 
authorized the cross-appeal, and its counsel filed the Notice of 
Cross-Appeal on October 20, 1988. 
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Lawyers Title never knew that its Notice of Cross-
Appeal could be considered to have been untimely filed until it 
received Tower's Reply Brief and Brief in Opposition to Lawyers 
Title's Cross-Appeal. Tower did not raise this issue in its 
Docketing Statement, nor in its initial Brief on Appeal. 
Furthermore, this Court has not raised the question of 
untimeliness sua sponte. Nowf at this late date, and when Tower 
cannot be prejudiced by Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal going 
forward, Tower raises the issue. 
After learning of Tower's claim of Lawyers Title's 
untimeliness in filing its Notice of Cross-Appeal, Lawyers 
Title's counsel contacted the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office 
on August 15, 1989, and learned from deputy clerk Sue Richards 
that the date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal was October 
6, 1988. This meant that Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal 
was timely filed. However, to be certain, Lawyers Title's 
counsel contacted the Third District Court Clerk's Office. He 
learned for the first time that the records in the Third District 
Court Clerk's Office were now reflecting that the date of filing 
of Tower's Notice of Appeal was October 5, 1988. 
After several more discussions with the Utah Supreme 
Court Clerk's Office and the Third District Court Clerk's Office, 
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as well as obtaining a copy of the Third District Court's file 
copy of Tower's Notice of Appeal, Lawyers Title's counsel learned 
from Sue Richards at the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office that 
when she had received (in October 1988) the Third District 
Court's copy of Tower's Notice of Appeal, she could not read the 
date stamp. She immediately called the Third District Court 
Clerk's Office to find out the date of filing of Tower's Notice 
of Appeal. She was told that the date of filing was October 6, 
1988. She entered that date into the Supreme Court file, which 
date has stayed in that file until August 15, 1989. 
Meanwhile, some time subsequent to October 6, 1988 and 
before August 15, 1989, the Third District Court Clerk's Office 
apparently decided that the date of filing of Tower's Notice of 
Appeal was in fact October 5, not October 6, 1988. They 
accordingly changed their computer records, but did not notify 
the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office, nor any parties to this 
Appeal. The Utah Supreme Court Clerk's file continued to reflect 
the date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal as October 6, 
1988. This information was given to Lawyers Title's counsel. In 
reliance thereon, Lawyers Title filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal 
on October 20, 1988. 
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As can be seen from the Affidavit of Sue Richards, the 
Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office frequently receives calls from 
attorneys to determine dates of the filings of various documents, 
including notices of appeal. The Utah Supreme Court Clerk's 
Office's dates have always been consistent with the dates in the 
various state district courts from which appeals are taken. If 
the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office does not have the date 
requested, they refer the attorney to the lower court from which 
the appeal was taken. Until now there have not been instances 
where the Utah Supreme Court Clerk has given an attorney a date 
that is inconsistent with the Lower Court's records. 
Even if Lawyers Title's counsel had called the Third 
District Court prior to October 20, 1988 to determine the date of 
filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal, it is certain that he would 
have been told October 6, rather than October 5, as the date of 
Tower's filing, since October 6 is the date that Sue Richards was 
told when she contacted the Third District Court Clerk's Office 
in mid-October, 1988 to clarify the date of filing of Tower's 
Notice of Appeal. Thus, even if Lawyer Title's counsel had 
called both clerk's offices he would have been given the same 
information and would have determined that the last day to file 
the Notice of Cross-Appeal was October 20, 1988. 
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C. What Little Case Law There Is On Timeliness Of Cross-
Appeals Supports Lawyers Title's Claim Of Timeliness 
As noted above, Lawyers Title acted prudently in 
attempting to effectuate a timely filing of its Notice of Cross-
Appeal. It reasonably relied upon the information it received 
from the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office with regard to the 
date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal. The Supreme Court 
Clerk reasonably relied upon the information supplied by the 
District Court Clerk's office. Based upon that date, Lawyers 
Title timely filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal. Even if the Court 
interprets Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in an 
extremely strict and technical sense, such that Lawyers Title's 
Notice of Cross-Appeal was not filed timely, the facts herein 
should be considered a classic situation of "excusable neglect." 
Although the "excusable neglect" standard is a strict 
one when it arises in a jurisdictional context, the facts herein 
meet it, as Lawyers Title has been diligent in taking its Cross-
Appeal and only as a result of inaccurate communications between 
the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office and the Third District 
Court Clerk's Office is a timeliness question now being raised. 
Accordingly, the Court should deem this situation at worst one of 
"excusable neglect" and extend to Lawyers Title by one day the 
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time in which it could timely file its Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 676 P.2d 952 
(Utah 1984). 
The extant case law in Utah on timeliness of cross-
appeals is quite limited; what case law there is is almost 
entirely devoted to questions of timeliness on notices of appeal, 
not cross-appeal. The sole case on cross-appeals, Dixon v. 
Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), examines former Rule 74(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which has since been 
superceded by Rule 4(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Dixon, a procedurally odd case, the plaintiffs 
appealed in one case, and the defendants appealed in another 
case. The plaintiffs moved for dismissal of defendants' appeal 
in the second case on the grounds that it was not taken within 
one month after the entry of the summary judgment by the lower 
court. The defendants countered that they had not filed a notice 
of appeal, but rather a notice of cross-appeal, which, if their 
argument was accepted, would have been filed within the fourteen-
day period after the filing of plaintiffs7 notice of appeal. The 
Court noted that the defendants did not designate their appeal as 
a cross-appeal, and they also failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 74(b), which required them to file a 
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statement of the points on which they intended to rely. 
Notwithstanding that, the Court exercised its discretion not to 
dismiss the appeal, claiming that under a liberal construction of 
former Rule 73(a) the defendants' appeal could be considered as a 
timely filed cross-appeal. Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d at 881. 
In In Re: M.S.. 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Utah App. 1989), 
the Utah Court of Appeals, on its own motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice of appeal, determined 
that the appeal needed to be sent back to the juvenile court for 
determination whether an order extending the time for appeal 
should be entered. No such motion sua sponte has been made by 
this Court in this appeal, no doubt because until August 15, 
1989, the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office's records indicated 
that the date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal was October 
6, rather than October 5. 
The Court in In re: M.S. indicated that it was bound by 
the filing date on the notice of appeal, particularly because 
Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals specifically 
precluded the Court from suspending the requirements or 
provisions of Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. A similar argument does not hold for Lawyers Title and 
its Notice of Cross-Appeal. Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah 
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Supreme Court states, similar to Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, that the Supreme Court, on its own motion or 
for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions 
of Rules 4(a), 4(e), 5(a), and 45, suspend the requirements or 
provisions of any of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in a 
particular case and may order proceedings in that case in 
accordance with its direction. Rule 2 specifically does not 
identify Rule 4(d) as one of the Rules that the Supreme Court 
cannot suspend. 
Accordingly, and if this Court determines in the 
instant case that it generally must require extremely strict and 
technical compliance with Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Rule 2 provides this Court with discretion to 
suspend that compliance, which Lawyers Title urges it exercise in 
light of the facts of this appeal. Indeed, Justice Stewart spoke 
against such rigid and technical compliance with procedural rules 
in his dissent in Isaacson v. Dorius. 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
The Isaacson case dealt with the timeliness issue on a notice of 
appeal under former Rule 73(a). In circumstances similar to the 
instant case, that is, where counsel for the appellant attempted 
to effectuate a timely filing of a notice of appeal, yet the 
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majority of the court determined that the appeal was untimely, 
Justice Stewart said: 
I respectfully submit that the notice of 
appeal should be deemed timely filed in this 
case. Counsel acted prudently in attempting 
to effectuate a timely filing of a notice of 
appeal in accordance with our rules of 
procedure. The reason the notice was not 
actually filed with the court in the time 
prescribed by the rules was either because of 
the delay in the delivery of mail or because 
of the failure of the clerk to file the 
notice promptly upon receipt. In either 
event, the fault was not the appellant's. 
Indeed the appellant had the right to rely on 
the mails being delivered in time and on 
timely filing by the clerk. 
Under the circumstances, I see no substantial 
reason to deny the appellant the right to 
appeal. There is no prejudice to any party 
involved. There was a good faith and 
reasonable effort to comply with the specific 
rules governing the filing of a notice of 
appeal. I think a clear-cut good faith 
effort to meet the one-month filing date 
ought to be sufficient since there is no 
overriding public policy that requires a 
technical and rote compliance with the rule 
irrespective of the sacrifice of substantial 
and important substantive rights. 
Id. at 851-852. 
As in the Isaacson case, but more particularly because 
the instant issue is a notice of cross-appeal timeliness issue 
rather than a notice of appeal timeliness issue, and because this 
Court need not adhere to the strict requirements of Rule 4(d), as 
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it must to Rule 4(a), Lawyers Title submits that even if the 
Court determines that Lawyers Title must still be charged with 
untimeliness notwithstanding the inadequate communications 
between the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office and the Third 
District Court Clerk's Office, Lawyers Title will be extremely 
prejudiced if its Cross-Appeal is dismissed, and yet Tower will 
not be prejudiced at all if the Cross-Appeal goes forward. The 
issues have been fully briefed, both at the lower court level and 
before this Court. If this Court deems that Lawyers Title's 
Notice of Cross-Appeal is untimely, it should use its discretion 
under Rule 2 to hear Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal. 
D. Tower Is Not Entitled To Any Damages Under Rule 33(a) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Tower claims that Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-
Appeal is untimely, that Lawyers Title must have known that it 
was untimely, and therefore Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal was 
taken either frivolously or for delay. For all of the reasons 
stated above, Tower's claim lacks merit. Furthermore, for the 
reasons set forth at length in Lawyers Title's responding brief, 
Lawyers Title's Appeal of the lower court's denial of its Motion 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-
56 (1953, as amended) has merit, both as a matter of law and 
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under the undisputed facts of this case. Accordingly, Tower is 
not entitled to any damages under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers Title reasonably relied upon the information it 
obtained from the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office with regard 
to the date Tower filed its Notice of Appeal. Based upon that 
reasonable reliance, Lawyers Title timely filed its Notice of 
Cross-Appeal on October 20, 1988. In the event that the Court 
strictly construes Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Lawyers Title's filing of its Notice of Cross-Appeal 
should be deemed timely based either upon "excusable neglect" or 
upon a suspension or modification of Rule 4(d), through the 
operation of Rule 2, of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Because Lawyers Title's Notice of Cross-Appeal should 
be deemed timely filed, Tower's argument that it is entitled to 
damages under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
is without merit. 
Based upon the foregoing, Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal 
should be heard, Tower's claim for damages under Rule 33(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court should be denied, and the 
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Lower Court's final Order granting Lawyers Title Summary Judgment 
against Tower should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^/ day of August, 1989 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
\ 
By h 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
FIGARI & DAVENPORT 
Mark T. Davenport 
Doug K. Butler 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-




A - Affidavit of Sue Richards 
B - Affidavit of Jeffrey R. Oritt 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICj^ 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of August, 1989, 
I hereby caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief to be hand-delivered to the 
following counsel of record: 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
Brian S. King, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and Cross-
Appellant's Brief to be delivered by placing the same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of 
record: 
John A. Kincaid, Jr., Esq. 
John R. O'Keefe, Jr., Esq. 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
2 Gateway Center, 19th Floor 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Supreme Court No. 88 0388 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUE RICHARDS 
STATE UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, SUE RICHARDS, being duly sworn, hereby depose and 
say that: 
1. I am a deputy clerk in the Office of the Clerk of 
the Utah Supreme Court, and was a deputy clerk in this Office in 
October, 1988. 
2. In mid-October 1988, I received from the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah a copy of Tower Federal 
Savings & Loan Association's ("Tower") Notice of Appeal. The 
date-stamp on the copy was illegible. 
3. I called the Third District Court Clerk to 
determine on what date Tower filed its Notice of Appeal. The 
Clerk informed me that she believed that the date-stamp on 
Tower's Notice of Appeal indicated October 6, 1988 as the date of 
filing. 
4. I then entered that date into the computer in the 
Clerk's Office with regard to the above-referenced matter. 
5. I did not learn until today, August 15, 1989, that 
the District Court had at some point after mid-October, 1988, 
determined that the filing date for Tower's Notice of Appeal was 
October 5, 1988. 
6. Generally, the date that we have in our computer 
with regard to dates of filing of Notices of Appeal are the same 
dates in the computers for files of the various District Courts 
around the State. 
7. The Supreme Court Clerk's Office often receives 
telephone calls from attorneys requesting dates in the files of 
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various appeals, including filing dates for notices of appeal. 
If we do not have a filing date in our computer, it means that we 
have not received the notice of appeal from the District Court in 
which the trial court sat. In that instance, we refer the 
attorney to the District Court Clerk's Office to learn the filing 
date. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
Dated this 15th day of August, 1989. 
"Sue Richards 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ) day of 
August, 1989.
 n * I j 
Notary P * « M ^ / J ^ Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
/ i j 1 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 880388 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFREY R. ORITT 
STATE UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JEFFREY R. ORITT, being duly sworn, hereby depose 
and say that: 
1. I am local counsel for respondent and cross-
appellant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") 
in the above-referenced case. I have acted in this capacity 
since the case out of which this appeal was taken commenced in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in 
1985. 
2. On October 5, 1988, the local counsel for Tower 
Federal Savings & Loan Association ("Tower") hand-delivered 
Tower's Notice of Appeal from the Lower Court's September 6, 1988 
final Order to my office at or about 5:00 p.m. 
3. On or about October 16, 1988, I called the Utah 
Supreme Court Clerk's Office to determine the date of filing of 
Tower's Notice of Appeal in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
order to determine the last date on which Lawyers Title could 
timely file its Notice of Cross-Appeal, if it decided to cross-
appeal the Lower Court's final Order. 
4. I was told by a deputy clerk at the Utah Supreme 
Court Clerk's Office that the date of filing of Tower's Notice of 
Appeal was October 6, 1988. I reviewed Rule 4(d) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, which provides a cross-appellant fourteen 
days from the date of filing of the appellant's Notice of Appeal 
in which to file its Notice of Cross-Appeal. Accordingly, 
Lawyers Title had until 5:00 p.m. October 20, 1988 to file its 
Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
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5. On October 20, 1988, I filed Lawyers Title's 
Notice of Cross-Appeal in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. On August 15, 1989, after receiving and reviewing 
Tower's Brief in Opposition to Lawyers Title's Cross-Appeal, I 
learned that Tower was arguing for the first time that Lawyers 
Title untimely filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal. I called the 
Utah Supreme Court Clerk's Office and spoke with Deputy Clerk Sue 
Richards, who told me that the Supreme Court's file on this case 
showed the date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal as October 
6, 1988. I then called the Third District Court Clerk, who told 
me that the Third District Court's file on this case showed the 
date of filing of Tower's Notice of Appeal as October 5, 1988. 
1. I again called Sue Richards at the Utah Supreme 
Court Clerk's Office to tell her of the District Court Clerk's 
file date. She called the Third District Court Clerk's Office, 
and then called me back to tell me that this was the first she 
had learned of any change in the date of filing of Tower's Notice 
of Appeal. 
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
Dated this 24th day of August, 1989. 
)ri1 Jeffrey 
Subscribed and sworn t& before me this rO*nA day of 
August, 1989. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
' / 
My Commission Expires: 
April 25f 1993 
V *-- - *- T ~ ' 
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